
Jailbreak Archaeology
Testing 2022 Attacks on 2026 Models reveals a massive illusion in AI safety measurement.

The Stratigraphy of Exploits



The Excavation Parameters

Small & Local (Ollama)

Llama 3.2: 3.2B parameters (Meta's instruction-tuned small model).

DeepSeek-R1: 1.5B parameters (Reasoning-focused model with visible thinking traces).

Frontier Scale (Native CLIs)

Claude Sonnet 4.5: Anthropic's mid-tier model (via claude-code).

Codex GPT-5.2: OpenAI's coding-coding-focused model (via codex-cli).

Note: Zero API filtering.

Manual Human Validation & Cross-Model LLM Review (Claude/Gemini)

The Measurement Illusion

Automated keyword classifiers report response style, not semantic harm

Model	Heuristic (Illusion)	Corrected (Reality)	Gap
DeepSeek-R1 (1.5B)	80%	36%	2.2x Over-report
Llama 3.2 (3.2B)	32%	16%	2.0x Over-report
Claude Sonnet 4.5	34%	~0%	>30x Over-report
Codex GPT-5.2	75%	0%	∞ Over-report

Takeaway: The gap widens at the frontier. Frontier models produce structured, verbose refusals that keyword classifiers mistakenly read as compliance.

False Positives: Hallucination-as-Refusal

Scenario JA-CIPHER-001



Conclusion: Functionally a refusal (no harm produced), but mechanistically a hallucination.

False Negatives: The I-Refuse Sandwich

Scenario JA-REASON-005 on Llama 3.3 70B.



Capability Without Compliance



Safety Through Alignment

Model: Codex GPT-5.2

Mechanism: Decode -> Understand -> Refuse. The model demonstrates full capability to process the attack, then actively chooses refusal.

Safety Through Infrastructure

Model: Claude Sonnet 4.5

Mechanism: API blocks input. 10 of 12 cipher scenarios rejected before reaching the model. The model's own judgment is never tested.

Safety Through Incapability

Models: Llama 3.2, DeepSeek-R1 1.5B

Mechanism: Can't decode -> Hallucinate. The model doesn't understand the attack, so it invents benign content. Fragile as models scale.

The Anatomy of Robust Alignment



Core Insight: True alignment means the model can do the dangerous thing, but chooses not to—even in obscure attack vectors. It demonstrates consistent safety behavior across languages that are known weak spots for smaller models.

The Temporal Decay Gradient

Insight: Safety training for smaller reasoning models severely lags behind general-purpose models of equivalent scale.





A New Standard for Safety Measurement

Retire Keyword Heuristics

Studies reporting jailbreak success rates using keywords significantly significantly overstate vulnerability for encoding attacks, and understate it for reasoning models.

Mandate LLM-Based Classification

Deploying structured Judge pipelines (e.g., Gemini evaluating traces) –

to measure semantic harm, not response style.

Expand the Excavation

Scaling to n=20+ per cell for statistical robustness

Executing multi-turn persistence tests (Skeleton Key episodes).