[EVALUATION: MARCH 2026]

[THREAT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY]

STRUCTURAL FAILURE: THE STATE OF EMBODIED AI SAFETY

A diagnostic readout of 131,887 adversarial tests across 187 models.

[STATUS: UNALIGNED]

The Illusion of Transferred Safety

[DATA_INTEGRITY: NOMINAL]
[SYS_DIAGNOSTIC: ACTIVE]

	Chatbot AI	Embodied AI
Context	[CONTEXT_TYPE] Textual (Safe in isolation)	[CONTEXT_TYPE] Physical (Context defines danger)
Refusal Mechanism	[MECHANISM_STATUS] Non-generation (Model stops typing)	[MECHANISM_STATUS] The DRIP Paradox (Model says no, robot moves anyway)
Threat Model	[THREAT_VECTOR_ID] Malicious hacker / Jailbreaker	[THREAT_VECTOR_ID] Authorized user in a hurry
Safety Coupling	[COUPLING_FACTOR_METRIC] Separable (Can block bioweapons, keep poetry)	[COUPLING_FACTOR_METRIC] Tightly Coupled (Useful capability = Dangerous capability)

[DATA_INTEGRITY: NOMINAL]
[SYS_DIAGNOSTIC: ACTIVE]

The safety systems that work reasonably well for chatbots do not transfer to robots. The gap is not incremental. It is structural.

SCALE

187

Models Tested. From 0.8B parameter Raspberry Pi nodes to Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI frontier systems.

SCOPE

319

Scenarios. Covering 26 attack families across surgical robots, forklifts, drones, and factory humanoids.

VOLUME

141,020

Prompts. Drawn from 27 datasets (AdvBench, HarmBench, JailbreakBench) + longitudinal archaeology.

OUTPUT

131,887

Graded Results. 47,352 FLIP-graded via backward inference; 42,234 automated heuristics.



[ANALYSIS_MODULE: INFERENCE]

[SYS_STATUS: NOMINAL]

Finding 1: The Inverse Detectability-Danger Law.

Current evaluators detect harmful language. But the most dangerous embodied attacks have no textual signature. "Pick up the container" is benign in text, but lethal when the container holds caustic chemicals.



Coupling Coefficient (Gamma) ≈ 1.0

Finding 2: Competence-Danger Coupling (CDC)

Finding 2: Compeetence-Danger Coupling (CDC). You cannot filter dangerous instructions without breaking useful ones. Unlike a chatbot, an embodied model’s utility is inextricably coupled to its physical threat.

ANATOMY OF A FAILURE



DATA TELEMETRY

- VLA Action-Level Refusals: 0% (across 63 FLIP-graded traces)
- PARTIAL verdicts (Disclaimer + Action): 50%
- Broad Attack Success Rate: 79.3%
- Functionally Dangerous Output: 80.3%

[ANALYSIS_MODULE: DIAGNOSTIC]

[SYS_STATUS: CRITICAL]

FINDING 3: THE DRIP PARADOX.

Decorative Refusal with Implemented Performance. For a chatbot, a disclaimer + bad text is a partial failure. For a robot, moving after saying ‘no’ is a complete, structural failure.

FINDING 4: THE EVALUATION TRILEMMA

HEURISTIC CLASSIFIERS

Detects "step-by-step" style rather than actual semantic harm

SMALL GRADER MODELS

15% accuracy for a 1.7B parameter grader, defaulting to PARTIAL 58% of the time

1.5B reasoner shows 30.8% false positive rate

THE ASYMMETRIC ERROR



Fast, cheap, or accurate—pick two. The field optimizes for fast/cheap, resulting in fundamentally unreliable safety numbers that systematically understate physical risk.

RETADATA

[SFSTER_STATUS: CRITICAL]

[THREAT_VECTOR: CONVERGENCE]

Embodied AI Threat Triangle

IDDL
(Safety systems are blind)

CDC
(Normal requests are dangerous)

CLINICAL THREAT

Expected Threat

Sophisticated hacker bypassing firewalls.

ACTUAL THREAT

Actual Threat

A warehouse worker in a rush saying, “Skip the safety check, we are behind schedule.”

The Unintentional Adversary

DRIP
(Refusals don’t stop actions)

[SYSTER_STATUS: CRITICAL]

[THREAT_VECTOR: CONVERGENCE]

Because ordinary user instructions carry no adversarial signature, the time-pressured authorized user will generate more expected harm across a fleet’s lifetime than a targeted attacker.

[SYSTER_STATUS: NOKIE]



Safety training investment matters, but it creates a fragile illusion. A simple formatting trick raises compliance with adversarial physical requests by an order of magnitude, bypassing frontier models.

[SYSTEM_STATUS: CRITICAL]

[DATA_STREAM: LIVE]

REGULATORY GAP: VLA DEPLOYMENT vs. GOVERNANCE



3.9 to 9.2-Year Deficit

110
GLI Entries Analyzed

90%
Base Null Rate
(No governance exists)

100%
VLA-Specific Null Rate

ANALYSIS_PROTOCOL:
GOVERNANCE_LAG_ASSESSMENT

[DATA_STREAM: LIVE]

[THREAT_VECTOR: REGULATORY_GAP]

Blueprint Step 1: Embodied-Specific Safety Evaluation.

0 Embodied Scenarios.
Tests if a model says something harmful.

[THREAT_ANALYSIS: TEXT-BASED_ONLY_NO_ACTUATION_LAYER]



Tests if a model will do
something harmful.

[SYSTEM_STATUS: PHYSICAL_SIM_INITIALIZED]

We cannot fix what we cannot measure. We must build benchmarks that test action-layer safety.
The 319 scenarios from this report serve as the open-source starting point.

[DATA_STREAM: LIVE] [PROTOCOL: BLUEPRINT_PHASE_1]

[METRIC: ACTION_SAFETY_BENCHMARK] [STATUS: IN_PROGRESS]

Blueprint Step 2: Action-Layer Constraints

[SYSTEM_STATUS: CRITICAL_CONSTRAINTS_MISSING]



Current VLA safety operates entirely at the text layer, leading to 0% action-level refusal rates. Manufacturers must implement safety constraints directly at the action-token level. Building a robot with only text-layer safety is like building a car with brakes on the steering wheel but not on the tires.

[PROTOCOL: ACTION_LAYER_SAFETY_INIT]

Blueprint Step 3: Evaluator Quality Standards

STRICTN UI CHECKLIST

1. Minimum Accuracy Limits: Safety classifiers cannot be deployed if false-positive/false-negative rates exceed physical safety tolerances.

[ACCURACY_THRESHOLD: CRITICAL]

STRICTN UI CHECKLIST

2. Calibration Data: Grader models must be calibrated on verified physical-world datasets, not just LLM-generated text.

[DATA_SOURCE: VERIFIED_PHYSICAL]

STRICTN UI CHECKLIST MENU

3. Error Rate Disclosure: Evaluator confidence metrics and error rates must be published alongside all frontier model safety numbers.

[METRIC_TRANSPARENCY: MANDATORY]

If your safety measuring tool is wrong **30-88%** of the time, your safety measurements are not safety measurements.

[DATA_INTEGRITY: CRITICAL_FAILURE_ALERT] [MEASUREMENT_STANDARD: INVALID]

Blueprint Step 4: Governance at Deployment Speed



A governance framework that arrives in 2030 for a physical vulnerability documented in 2024 is not a governance framework. It is a post-mortem. We must abandon 9-year policy cycles for hardware-integrated AI.

THE SCALE

[DATA_VOLUME: MAXIMAL]
[SYSTEM_SCOPE: GLOBAL]

[MODELS_EVALUATED: 187] |
[GRADED_RESULTS: 131,887] |
[SCENARIOS: 319]

[DATA_VOLUME: MAXIMAL] [SYSTEM_SCOPE: GLOBAL]

THE FAILURES

[SYSTEM_PREPLEYE]

[STRICT_ACTION_SUCCESS_RATE: 45.9%] |
[BROAD_ACTION_SUCCESS_RATE: 79.3%] |
[VLA_ACTION_LEVEL_REFUSAL: 0%]

⚠ [CRITICAL_FAILURE_ALERT]



THE STRUCTURAL GAPS

[ALIGNNENT_ERROR: CRITICAL]
[GOVERNANCE_VOID: DETECTED]

[HEURISTIC/LLM_AGREEMENT:
KAPPA = 0.126] |
[VLA_GOVERNANCE_NULL_RATE: 100%]

[ALIGNMENT_ERROR: CRITICAL]

THE DIRECTIVES

[POLICY_RECOMMENDATION: IMMEDIATE]
[SYSTEM_UPGRADE: REQUIRED]

1. EMBODIED BENCHMARKS
2. ACTION-LAYER TOKENS
3. EVALUATOR STANDARDS
4. RAPID GOVERNANCE

[SYSTEH_UPGRADE: REQUIRED]